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Synthetic Biology and Ethics: A Biosecurity Argument
Marko Ahteensuu
Division of Philosophy, Royal Institute of Technology, University of Turku (Sweden)
Synthetic biology–i.e. an engineering-based modelling and building approach to biology–holds
promise for a number of practical applications in fields such as medicine, energy production, material
technology, and bioremediation. At the same time, synthetic biology raises a welter of ethical issues. It
has become customary to group them into two categories: Intrinsic concerns embody the idea that
(specific) research on and/or practical applications of synthetic biology are morally questionable
because of some feature of (the use of) the technology in itself, irrespective of its consequences.
Questions of this type include, for example, the following. Does constructing new forms of life cross
moral boundaries of playing god, unnaturalness or human hubris? According to extrinsic concerns,
(specific) research on and/or practical applications of synthetic biology are morally questionable
because of their (known and possible) consequences. Following questions belong to this group: Does
“creating” new kinds of organisms and species change the way we perceive nature and ourselves? Does
the use of synthetic biology result in unjust distributions in society? Besides these, intrinsic concerns
also involve worries about possible harmful consequences to human health, animals and the
environment. Here it has become standard to talk about the management of two kinds of risks. On the
one hand, biosafety refers to principles, practices and specific actions taken to prevent possible
unintended and unexpected consequences. Laboratory facility requirements and protection measures in
relation to four classes (risk groups) of pathogenic microorganisms provide an example. On the other
hand, biosecurity refers to principles, practices and specific actions taken to prevent intentional misuse
of synthetic biology. This forms a continuum ranging from mere “bionuisance” to bioterrorism and to
biological war.
I begin with pointing out that ethical questions that are highly similar to those of synthetic
biology have been extensively discussed before in the context of gene ethics and the ethics of new
technologies. It is in fact a matter of disagreement whether there is anything new, ethically speaking, in
synthetic biology. I will argue, however, that at least biosecurity considerations pertaining to synthetic
biology are to some extent new. I will highlight differences in response to “synbiosecurity” in the United
States (US) and the European Union (EU), and discuss possible reasons for why in the US biosecurity
concerns related to synthetic biology have received more attention in media and by regulators than in
the EU. This is followed by an analysis of a biosecurity argument, the core of which is explicated below.
It turns out that the general argument–as it is often stated in the literature and discussions–needs to be
qualified, and that many improvements to biosecurity have already been implemented, mainly as selfgovernance of research and industry. Furthermore, I suggest a new specific strand of the argument: as
synthetic biology falls under gene technology regulation in the EU, the divergence in biosecurity
considerations (when compared to those of gene technology) provides a reason to review and possibly
make refinements to the legislation as well as administrative and supervisory practices in the EU.
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Ethical Issues and Medical Error: Preparing for the Unknown
Shirley Bach
Western Michigan University, Center for the Study of Ethics in Society
Homer Stryker M.D. School of Medicine
The publication in 1999 of the Institute of Medicine report, “To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health
System” was a most significant event which galvanized both the medical profession and the public to
deal constructively with medical error. It stimulated public discussion as well as institutional and
professional reflection, with regard to our dedication to prevent medical errors and to deal
constructively and ethically when medical errors do occur. Only a short time earlier, there were
significant disclosures in the press of wrong site surgeries and fatal medication errors in clinical practice
and research, and these disclosures added to the dedication to address the magnitude of the problem.
As professionals, we asked how we ought to respond to the current increased concern in enhancing
patient safety and reducing medical error? In addition, we addressed the ethical basis for this response
on a personal, institutional, and professional society level.
Since we have a professional duty to benefit patients and reduce harm whenever possible, we have, at
the very least, a moral obligation to incorporate the techniques already in existence in order to reduce
errors. In addition, it was felt that we should consider our obligation to go beyond what is already
known and support research in new methodologies aimed at enhancing patient safety.
When errors do occur, we must develop an ethically defensible approach to dealing with them. Respect
for patients finds expression in telling the truth, in being honest with patients. Trust in the healthcare
system, and certainly trust in our physicians, is founded on the expectation of honesty and the belief
that the physician is working in the patient’s best interest. There is also an expectation that when
patients are injured, we owe them or their families a prompt and full disclosure. Patients want an
honest explanation and, if appropriate, an apology. Furthermore many patients have said that it is
important that others not be harmed in the same way and therefore they should be informed that the
factors involved in the injury will be investigated in order to reduce the likelihood of a similar injury to
future patients.
The Roman god, Janus, looks forward and backwards also. If we have made significant recent progress in
reducing harm to patients, medical professionals are now looking at where the need appears greatest in
the future. One area which warrants increased attention is the need to address the magnitude of
patient harm from diagnostic error. This particular concern looms large when considering the
extraordinary possibilities of increased genomic research and decisions that must be made as
personalized medicine becomes more of a reality. Another area of ethical concern is the necessity to
address the importance for timely and appropriate apology, as well as the offer of appropriate
compensation, if patients have been harmed.
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The Voice is As Mighty as the Pen: Integrating Conversations into Advance Care
Planning Policies
Kunal Bailoor
University of Michigan Medical School
Advance care planning allows patients to reflect upon and articulate their preferences with
regard to their medical treatment, lifestyle, and surrogate decision makers in order to anticipate and
mitigate their potential loss of decision making capacity. Ideally, advance care planning is a dynamic
process in which patients analyze their preferences regarding medical interventions, goals of care, and
quality of life and communicate these preferences to their healthcare providers. Written advance
directives are often emphasized in this regard. These written statements of preferences may take many
forms, including designation of a surrogate decision maker, living wills containing written statements of
preference, Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) orders, and heath care proxies. While these contain important
information, there are several barriers to consider: veracity and accuracy of surrogate decision-makers
making choices consistent with the substituted judgment standard, state to state variability in
regulations, literacy issues, lack of access to legal resources, and cultural inadequacies. These barriers
can often prevent vulnerable patient populations from making use of these written statements of
preference. In addition, patient preferences are dynamic with time and health status. Given these
issues, it is vital to increase our use of patient and healthcare provider conversations as an advance care
planning tool, and to increase integration of such discourse into advance care planning policy as
adjuncts and complements to written advance directives. We refer specifically to clinician-patient
conversations that are subsequently documented in the patient’s progress notes, which we refer to as
“documented interactions.” This paper reviews current national and state laws with regards to written
advance directives and dissects how documentation of these verbal interactions can help patients faced
with legal barriers. We discuss specific changes made our institution as a potential model to illustrate
challenges related to implementation. Finally, we explore the ethical issues surrounding the increased
usage and recognition of clinician-patient conversations in advanced care planning including whether
written orders and documented conversations should be considered equivalently; whether documented
interactions can be used for pediatric patients; and the potential issues with bias inherent to medical
documentation.
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Bioethics Training for Front Line Medical Providers and Staff: Legal and Ethical Issues
Emily Bergquist, Master of Science in Administration Program, Central Michigan University, and Daniel
LoBello, Western Michigan University Cooley Law School
Emily Elder, Master of Science in Administration Program, Central Michigan University, and Christopher
Marker, Western Michigan University Cooley Law School
Kineta Sadler, Master of Science in Administration Program, Central Michigan
University, and Holliann Willekes, Western Michigan University Cooley Law School
Chair: Julie Janeway, Western Michigan University Cooley Law School
Panel summary: Each law student will be paired with a front line medical provider or staff
member. The moderator will introduce the topic and structure of the presentation. Each front line
individual will briefly discuss bioethics issues she has encountered personally, and situations that are
encountered commonly by providers and staff other than nurses or physicians. Examples of issues
include conflicting morals and values among care teams, intersection of personal morality and
technology among front line providers, allocation of quality healthcare resources to those considered
undeserving or unworthy, patient autonomy and listening to and respecting patient requests and
requirements, and issues of patient safety and prevention of medical error, among others, and their
intersection with the ethical principles of medicine and health law.
Each accompanying law student will discuss the legal and ethical issues that may result from the
lack of bioethics training for this segment of the health care worker population. The panelists and
moderator will then present a model protocol and training module curriculum for adoption by health
care organizations regarding bioethics and legal issue training for health care providers and
administrative staff. Following the panelists’ presentation of the material, the presentation will be
opened for questions from the audience. Panelists will answer questions posed, and the moderator will
augment where necessary.

Patient Understanding and Satisfaction Regarding the Clinical Use of Whole Genome Sequencing:
Findings from the Medseq Project
Archana D. Bharadwaj
Department of Health Behavior and Health Education, University of Michigan School of Public Health
The development of new techniques has reduced the time and cost of Whole Genome
Sequencing (WGS), and the resulting increase in availability of genetic testing has generated excitement
due its potential to tailor medical treatment. However, the integration of WGS into clinical practice
poses challenges for informed consent and disclosure of test results. Few empirical studies have
examined patients’ understanding of and satisfaction with the clinical communication of WGS results in
contexts outside of specialty cancer care such primary care and cardiology.
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The MedSeq Project is a randomized clinical trial examining the impacts of WGS in two contexts:
general genomic medicine, modeled through the use of primary care patients, representing the use of
WGS as a preventative measure and disease-specific genome medicine, modeled through the use of
cardiomyopathy patients, representing the use of WGS to examine genomic causes for conditions in
there is a family history. We analyzed survey data from two time points: 1) patients’ initial enrollment
and 2) immediately following disclosure of sequencing results by a physician. Domains of interest
included understanding of informed consent, subjective understanding, satisfaction with
communication of results, and decisional regret. Surveys included both validated (e.g., decisional regret)
and novel (e.g., understanding of informed consent) self-report measures.
Survey responses were provided by 202 participants (mean age = 55 years; 51% male; 80%
college graduates). At enrollment, participants understood the majority of key facts about the study
(mean = 19.6 / 22 items (89%) answered correctly), although some participants incorrectly answered
items addressing results to be returned (e.g., 18% believed they would receive their entire DNA
sequence) and potential risks to genetic privacy (e.g., 14% did not recognize how widely their data
would be shared). Higher informed consent knowledge scores were associated with female gender,
greater genomic knowledge, higher subjective numeracy, and higher education levels (all p < .05). After
results disclosure, participants had low scores of regret regarding decision to participate in the study
(mean score = 10/100 at results disclosure); they also reported high levels of satisfaction with their
physicians’ disclosure of results (mean = 5.9 on a 6-point scale), although ~20% of participants reported
receiving “too much” information. Satisfaction with communication did not vary by participants’
demographics or other characteristics (e.g. genomic knowledge).
This study of the clinical application of genome sequencing in medicine suggests that the
intervention was generally well understood by patients, with low levels of decisional regret and high
levels of satisfaction with the communication of sequencing results. Future research will be necessary to
examine these issues in more diverse samples of patients (e.g., with broader ranges of health literacy),
where misconceptions about the clinical use of sequencing identified here may be more pronounced
and patient concerns about information overload may be magnified.

Embracing the Chiaroscuro: Rethinking Ambiguity in the Medical Treatment of
Transgender Youth
Lauren Baker
Albert Gnaegi Center for Health Care Ethics, University of St. Louis
In “Lives in chiaroscuro: Should we suspend the puberty of children with gender identity
disorder?” bioethicist Simona Giordano argues that gender dysphoria arises due to the experience of life
as ambiguously gendered, that transgender children who are denied treatment are at risk for violence
and suicide, and that puberty suppression saves lives. Given the life threatening risks of delaying
treatment, she contends that it is unethical to deny puberty suppression for children diagnosed with
gender dysphoria. I agree with Giordano that there are many gender nonconforming children who
experience the intense distress that she describes. I also agree that puberty suppression offers a wide
range of benefits and is necessary for many children. But in this paper presentation, I will argue, contra
Giordano, it is not gender ambiguity in itself which causes distress, but the non-acceptance of a child's
gender ambiguity which leads to the psychological pain and violence that she identifies. Following, I will
5
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suggest that Giordano’s position may in fact be harmful to children given that it reinforces the root
cause of distress which many gender nonconforming individuals experience. My intent in this paper is
not to dismiss the importance of early medical interventions such as puberty suspension, but to
illuminate how biases towards a dichotomous understanding of gender shapes both how gender
nonconforming youth are represented in medical literature, and how these children are medically
treated.

Contextualizing the Reactions to CRISPR Following Centuries of Eugenic Medical Intervention
Shawna Benston
Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications (ELSI) of Genetics, Columbia University
Reproductive genetic technologies (RGTs), including gene-editing technology like CRISPR/Cas9,
are being discovered and refined at an exponential pace. The potential uses for CRISPR are wide-ranging
and include both therapeutic and enhancement applications, either to somatic cells or to germ cells.
Scientific and scholarly debate has erupted over various permutations of CRISPR application, especially
its use for “enhancement” editing of germ cells. As these technologies continue being developed, it is
worth investigating whether the fervidness of the ensuing debate is truly a warranted reaction to
unprecedented innovations, or merely par for the course in the realm of medical technology.
In coining the term “eugenics,” Sir Francis Galton defined it as the science that deals with “all
influences that improve the inborn qualities of a race” and “those that develop them to the utmost
advantage.” In general terms, eugenics is viewed as detrimental when technology is used to select for
particular traits deemed “desirable” at the expense of any people who have alternative traits, and as
beneficial when the technology is focused on elimination of agreed-upon disease. Much opposition to
CRISPR concerns the potential for detrimental eugenics, the slippery slope to a genetically engineered
society favoring certain traits—intellectual, cognitive, emotional, physical, or racial—above others. We
must seek to balance this valid concern with a perhaps equally valid attraction to beneficial eugenics:
the parental desire to shape their children and provide them with an open future. As part of our
exploration and in light of CRISPR’s limitations, we must determine whether the surge of varied
reactions to CRISPR is in fact disproportionate to the technology’s potential promises and pitfalls.
We might view reactions to CRISPR as disproportionate when considering that this technology
follows a long line of medical interventions designed to sustain and improve the human species. Since
the onset of modern medicine, our survival and success as individuals and as a society have been a
product of technological intervention. Whether saved from the potentially dire implications of breech
birth, rendered disease-free by means of surgery or pharmaceuticals, or granted extended life via an
organ transplant, human lives have been saved and prolonged by medical remedies for centuries. Such
interventions themselves encountered initial, and even long-running, controversial reception by the
bioethical and lay communities, who seek to assess whether benefits outweigh potential harms or the
production of ethical dilemmas.
This paper will explore the context of medical and technological innovation in which CRISPR has
emerged. When considering CRISPR’s potential application, we must work to understand what is
6
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actually feasible, and to craft the continuing debate in the most productive way possible. Can CRISPR be
used to engineer so-called “designer babies”? Is CRISPR more alarming than previously existing eugenics
technologies? Are current reactions to CRISPR really much different than were reactions to such
previously existing eugenics technologies when they first emerged?

Deceased Directed Donation: Considering the Ethical Permissibility in a Multi-Cultural Setting
Rebecca Greenberg, Department of Bioethics and Pediatrics, University of Toronto (Canada)
Andria Bianchi, Department of Bioethics, University of Waterloo (Canada)
This paper explores the ethics of deceased directed donation (DDD) and brings a unique
perspective to this issue – the relevance of providing family centred care and culturally sensitive care to
deceased donors, potential recipients, and their families. As the world is becoming more diverse with
globalization, assessing the cultural aspect of the ethics of DDD is increasingly salient. We provide a brief
overview of DDD across the globe, 2) review prominent arguments both for and against DDD, 3)
consider family centred and culturally-specific considerations, and 4) offer considerations for the
development of a policy or guideline. We determine that the practice of DDD is ethically defensible in
certain circumstances and congruent with providing both family centred and culturally sensitive care.
Our analysis is relevant to any country with a diverse population and any health care provider or
institution that operates under a framework of family centred care.

Engineering Uncertainty at the Intersection of Agency, Autonomy, and Authenticity
Timothy Brown and Laura Specker Sullivan
Department of Philosophy, University of Washington
Engineered devices connecting brains to computers once appeared in science fiction alone; now
they are becoming a reality. Researchers are experimenting with increasingly complex ways of
stimulating and communicating with the human brain: transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (tDCS),
Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS), and Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS), among others. The medical
applications of these technologies are diverse as well. tDCS has been used on patients with depression
and schizophrenia; DBS is widely used for patients with Parkinson’s disease and essential tremor; and
TMS has been tested to improve patients’ motor function and relieve neuropathic pain. For many
patients with pharmaceutical-resistant conditions, these neurotechnological therapies are their only
effective options. Researchers are also working on integrating these one-way stimulators with existing
neural sensors to determine how much to stimulate and when. These bi-directional brain computer
interfaces (BBCI) could detect when the user’s hand is tremoring or when the user is experiencing
symptoms of depression and respond by triggering stimulation.
Yet these treatments are not without side effects. As with pharmaceutical therapies, patients
may experience changes to their energy levels, behaviors, and everyday interests. Unlike
pharmaceuticals, patients may be unable to distinguish when the stimulator is active (and thus affecting
their behavior) and when it is inactive. This can create a fundamental uncertainty about the source of
the patient’s agency—is it the patient himself, or is it his TMS treatment that leads him to take time off
work to lie in bed and watch television? Is it her DBS that makes her restless in the evening and eager to
7
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buy expensive items online, or is that just a feature of her personality? Is it stress from work or the tDCS
treatment causing her body to tense up in ways that make it hard for her to relax? Furthermore, if
someone with a BBCI is experiencing tension in his close relationships, should he locate the source of
this tension in himself or in the effect that the BBCI has on his behavior? Understood in relational terms,
these technologies can affect not only an individual’s sense of self but also his or her relationships.
One way of understanding this uncertainty is to say that people using these technologies take on new
identities that intersect with their old identities. People using these technologies may be people with
disabilities, people of color, research subjects, and so on, all at once. Taking on these new roles along
with the old ones not only confuses agency, it can also frustrate autonomy and threaten authenticity as
well. This means that in addition to complicating patients’ intersecting identities, neurotechnological
therapies also increase the complexity of conceptual intersections in ethical analysis. Ethical assessment
of these therapies thus requires attention to two types of intersections: among patients’ identities and
among ethical concepts.
In this presentation, we analyze how neural engineering technologies generate uncertainty for
patients’ identities in terms of these three concepts: agency, autonomy, and authenticity. We propose
that understanding and appraising the effects of these technologies requires sensitivity to the complex
intersections of the user’s shifting identities and acknowledgment of the interplay of all three of the
aforementioned concepts. Finally, we provide suggestions for making sense of these intersections.

The Future of Psychiatric Deep Brain Stimulation: Dealing with the Unknown
Laura Cabrera and Devan Stahl
Center for Ethics and Humanities in the Life Sciences, Michigan State University
Tyler Gibb
Program in Medical Ethics, Humanities & Law
Western Michigan University Homer Stryker M.D. School of Medicine
Panel summary: In 2008, 128 patients enrolled in the Broaden Trial, a multi-center, controlled,
doubled-blind clinical research trial that investigated the efficacy of deep brain stimulation (DBS) for
patients with depression. Since DBS for depression is not yet approved by the Federal Drug
Administration, it was carried through out an investigational device exemption, which allows sponsors
to skip the standard phase I and phase II safety and efficacy trials. After only six months, however, St.
Jude Medical, the trial sponsor and maker of the DBS implant, terminated the trial when it failed to
reach its benchmark of a 50% response rate according to the Hamilton Depression Scale.1 Not only did
St. Jude fail to release a public statement about the trial’s termination, but also it did not inform the
study’s participants. Some of the participants in this multi-center study felt abandoned, with an unclear
picture of whether or not they would receive follow-up care by the company. There are certainly many
unknowns regarding psychiatric DBS, from whether or not its benefits are worth the risks, to whether
more regulation is needed in order to protect study participants.
This presentation will survey past psychosurgery practice and compare them to recent debates
over the use of DBS for psychiatric care. Although the FDA has approved the use of DBS for Parkinson,
1

Danielle Egan, “Adverse Affects: The Perils of Deep Brain Stimulation for Depression” Mad in America: Science,
Psychiatry and Community, September 24, 2015.
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essential tremor and dystonia, DBS for psychiatric conditions, such as depression, OCD, and anorexia
remains experimental and in the initial stages of research. Many worry that the risks for psychiatric
patients are higher than those for movement disorder’s patients, because the areas of the brain that are
targeted are in the cerebral cortex, which controls many essential functions of the brain as well as
patient’s “personality.” As we look to the future of neurosurgical interventions, we must consider the
very real ethical and regulatory challenges that remain when so little is understood about the etiology of
psychiatric disorders and the action of mechanism controlling DBS.

Selling under Uncertainty: A Prolegomena to an Account of the Morality of Selling
Ryan Cobb
Philosophy Department, University of Iowa
Many of the ethical questions facing medicine concern selling. It is at times taken as a datum
that the sale of certain items is morally wrong, or at least deeply troubling. For instance, the sale of
human tissue is widely banned, and it seems that at least part of the motivation is moral (that is, not
merely practical). New technologies—medical and otherwise—multiply such morally sticky issues, as
new markets and new products emerge. So, we might wonder whether it is permissible to sell one’s
genetic code (or portions thereof), or instructions on how to use a 3-D printer to make a gun. Ideally,
we would have an account of how to determine, for any combination of buyer, seller, and product,
whether the sale is permissible. But there are preliminary questions that we must address before giving
any such account—or before deciding that such an account is impossible. Failure to address these
questions dooms us to incomplete, fragmented accounts and leaves us unprepared to address new
questions in the ethics of selling. It would be nice to eliminate this uncertainty, if possible.
This paper addresses some of these preliminary questions. In particular, it addresses the
question of what constitutes a sale, and it considers what makes a sale wrong. Thus, this paper
functions as a prolegomena to developing accounts of the wrongness of particular types of sale. In the
first half of the paper, I address the question of what constitutes a sale. I then address, in the second
half, two differing accounts of what makes selling wrong. I consider the merits of each account, and
conclude by reflecting on some potential future work.
In the paper, I defend the following account of selling. A seller S can be said to have sold an
item or service I to a buyer B under the following conditions:
i) S and B agree to conditions for the transfer of ownership of I
ii) one of the conditions for the transfer of ownership of I is B compensating S with something
(perhaps money, perhaps another item) of value perceived to be of roughly comparable value to I
iii) S and B execute the conditions to which they agreed
iv) B takes ownership of I

This account, while likely “missing” some cases around the margins of selling, captures, I
contend, some essential philosophical features of the concept. With this preliminary account of selling
in hand, I proceed in the second half of the paper to consider two accounts of the wrongfulness of
selling. These are what I shall call the “human dignity” account and the “market pressures” account.

9
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Epistemology of HIV Transmission: Advancement, Uncertainty, and Dissemination of Information
Lacey Davidson and Mark Satta
Department of Philosophy, Purdue University
We utilize several recent studies concerning the transmission and treatment of HIV and
philosophical thought experiments to identify two levels of uncertainty: uncertainty in personal sexual
health and uncertainty that leads to epistemic public health injustice. First, we highlight individuals
engaging in sexual activity’s uncertainty regarding their sexual health and status information, and
second, we demonstrate that uncertainties in the developing discourse around these new research
conclusions leads to epistemic public health injustices. These injustices arise along faults of
marginalization and privilege within and among discourse communities. We focus on communities of
men who have sex with men (MSM) in particular. In light of these uncertainties, we must
reconceptualize the nature of sexual education and the cultural conversation about HIV status, focusing
on the uncertainty of transmission rates and protections, particularly as it pertains to the marginalized
groups most affected by negative stigmas surrounding HIV.
We begin our paper by presenting the recent sexual histories of a number of fictitious
characters. We ask our audience to think about which characters are at greatest risk of seroconverting
and which characters are dealing with the highest levels of uncertainty in terms of information about
likelihood of infection. We engage in this in order to challenge common assumptions about where risk
lies and to highlight often unrecognized sources of uncertainty due to deficiencies in the general public’s
information about HIV.
We next analyze recent research advancements relevant to HIV and HIV transmission risk that
provide the evidence for our claims about sources of risk and uncertainty, highlighting some of the
immediate epistemic upshots as we go. These findings are divided into five research themes: 1)
estimates about the percentage of people living in the United States with HIV who do not know they
have the disease, 2) information about the lag time between acquisition of HIV and the ability to test
positive for HIV, 3) information about the infectivity of those in primary HIV infection and estimates
about the percentage of new transmissions resulting from serodiscordant sex (i.e. sex in which one
partner is HIV-positive and the other HIV-negative) in which the HIV-positive partner is in primary
infection, 4) an explanation of what an undetectable viral load is, how such a status can be obtained,
and what current research suggests this means for infectivity, and 5) recent advancements in HIV
prophylaxis (i.e. preventative health measures) beyond the use of condoms.
We then identify ways in which distributions of privilege and marginalization between and
among MSM communities have led to distinct understandings and practices and some ways in which
these understandings and practices move in the direction of rectifying or exacerbating various epistemic
public health injustices related to HIV. We divide these epistemic public health injustices into three
categories: 1) structural-linguistic epistemic injustices, as we will call them, resulting in widespread
ignorance of HIV transmission risk among HIV-negative individuals, 2) hermeneutical injustices (Fricker
2007; Mason 2011) for HIV-positive people, and 3) and credibility-deficit testimonial injustices against
HIV-positive people, in particular black men.
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Informational Opacity and Consent in Clinical Genomic Sequencing
Michael Deem
Department of Multidisciplinary Studies, Indiana State University
Clinical expansion of whole-genome and whole-exome sequencing will compound difficulties
involved with ensuring that patient and family decisions about clinical management are informed and
responsible. Genomic sequencing yields an immense amount of data that must be analyzed and
interpreted in order to provide potential benefits to clinical care. The sheer volume of raw data presents
tremendous challenges to the effective communication of their potential clinical significance to
clinicians and to clinical counseling.
This paper discusses and clarifies three such obstacles to informed consent in genomic
medicine, all of which involve what I call 'informational opacity' in the interpretation and transmission of
genomic information:
(a)
(b)
(c)

the lack of a clinical-grade general database of identified variant-disease associations;
interpretive discrepancies in genomic analysis that undermine high-fidelity transmission
of information about the clinical utility of sequence variants from analysts to clinicians;
varying degrees of genetic literacy among clinicians and patients affects the handling
and communication of diagnostic information from genomic sequencing

Informational opacity in genomic medicine requires a rethinking of acceptable standards of
patient consent, especially because patients and their families are making decisions about a vast range
of unknown analysis and health outcomes. After discussing these three forms of opacity, the paper
develops and defends on ethical grounds a framework for communication of diagnostic information
from genomic sequencing and acquisition of patient consent where traditional standards of informed
consent cannot be satisfied. A new model of consent will become increasingly important as precision
medicine advances and renders traditional models of informed consent unrealistic.

Just Caring: Parsimonious Care in Certain Uncertain Circumstances
Leonard M. Fleck
Michigan State University
Uncertainty is a Hydra-headed phenomenon in health care. From a physician’s perspective there
often is uncertainty (many degrees) with respect to diagnosis (and the reliability of the technologies
needed to establish a diagnosis), prognosis (and the infinite variety of genetic, physiological,
pharmacological, behavioral, technological, economic, and cultural factors that affect the outcome of
prognostic judgments), the appropriateness of a therapeutic intervention (perhaps related to medical
disagreement), the likely effectiveness of a therapeutic intervention, the risk/ benefit ratio of a
therapeutic intervention (potentially complicated by co-morbid conditions), the likelihood of a patient
complying with the behaviors needed to maximize the likelihood of a therapeutic outcome, the
applicability of a clinical guideline to this patient in the clinic, the reliability of the evidence and research
behind that guideline, and, finally, the sheer randomness of natural events at various levels in the health
care encounter. That is the background for this presentation.
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Our question, however, is this: How should all this uncertainty be addressed in the economic/
political context of having to do health care rationing, and in the ethical context of having to do that
rationing justly? Today there is an increasing emphasis on the obligation of physicians to provide
parsimonious care, i.e., the prudent and cost-effective use of health care resources in caring for
individual patients. To focus discussion I offer several common examples, such as $100,000 precision
cancer drugs, $40,000 implantable cardiac defibrillators, PCSK9s for lowering “bad” cholesterol, access
to ICU beds---- all of which represent uncertain benefit at very great cost. DRGs as a hospital payment
mechanism are part of the same problem since they can motivate “premature” discharge of a patient,
thereby putting them at uncertain risk for an otherwise avoidable bad health outcome. If physicians
cooperate with the intent of DRGs (or other care protocols intended to promote parsimonious care), are
they treating their patients unjustly? Must physicians be virtually certain that no harm will come to
their patients in order to be just and justified in carrying out parsimonious protocols? “No” is the
response I will defend. If a patient does not have a just claim to some health care resource, then the
harm that “might” befall them as a result of that denial is properly regarded as being unfortunate but
not unjust.
Access to health care resources is about access to a limited common good. This is what makes
such access a matter of justice rather than a matter of informed consent wherein a patient weighs from
their point of view the risks and benefits (and related uncertainty) they are willing to trade off. Matters
of justice require social decisions. Patients do not have a presumptive just claim to a $100,000 cancer
drug if there is only a small chance that drug would yield an extra six months of life. What level of
certainty would generate such a just claim? There is no objectively correct answer to that question. It
needs to be resolved, I will argue, through a process of rational democratic deliberation, the results of
which will be just and legitimate for all in the relevant clinical circumstances.

Preparing for the Future by Looking at the Past: The Biopolitical Fragmentation of Terri Schiavo
Tyler Gibb
Program in Medical Ethics, Humanities & Law
Western Michigan University Homer Stryker M.D. School of Medicine
It has been over a decade since Terri Schiavo died. The drama the unfolded on television screens
and across the media between her husband, Michael Schiavo, and her parents, Robert and Mary
Schindler, captivated millions of people all over the globe. Fifteen years before her death, Terri
collapsed in her apartment after suffering a cardiac arrest. She suffered devastating anoxic brain injury,
which left her in a condition known as the persistent vegetative state. Over time, her husband and
parents, who were initially unified in a commitment to get her the best treatment available, slowly
drifted in different directions regarding how they believe she would be wanted to be treated as her
prognosis became more certain. The dispute between them eventually entered the court system and
captured the attention of the national international media. Despite hundreds of newspaper and
magazine articles, blog post, academic articles, books and countless hours of television and radio
coverage of what has become known as the Terri Schiavo case, several important questions remain
unanswered. Why did this case, which is widely regarded as the most intensely media-saturated end-oflife bioethics case is history, hit the public spotlight? In a country where similar end-of-life decisions are
made on a daily basis, what was unique about this case that propelled it into the national and
international consciousness? Was the Schiavo case merely an anomaly, or does it represent something
12
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more fundamentally problematic about medicine, the law, and our society? In this paper, using the
Schiavo case as an analytical lens, I offer ways to address these important questions. I argue that the
development and notoriety of the Schaivo case is due to a fundamental societal shift—what I describe
as biopolitical fragmentation. By reinterpreting the biopolitical theory of modern philosophy since
Foucault, I argue that the radical fragmentation seen in the Schiavo case is understandable as
symptomatic of a societal shot in how the human body, understood in its broadest sense, is fragmented
through the institutions of law, medicine, and society. This presentation will highlight how this analysis
illuminates a few specific fragments in the Schiavo case—the persistent vegetative state, and the role of
popular media. By looking carefully at the Schiavo case, future cases that challenge the foundation of
societal assumptions about good and bad in the delivery of health care can be better anticipated and
meaningfully engaged.

Special Obligations and Special Biases:
Parents as Proxies and the Release of Incidental Findings in Genetic and Genomic Research
Kelsey Gipe
Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland
As technology advances in the field of genetic and genomic research and testing, ethical issues
emerge. Particularly challenging are problems which arise from the discovery of incidental findings in
the course of such research and testing. There is much debate concerning the consent process for
release of incidental findings, and the question of which findings to disclose and how to obtain informed
consent for the release of such findings is as of yet unsettled. These are problems which only intensify in
regard to genetic and genomic research on children. In these cases, parents or guardians must act as
proxy consenters on behalf of the child subject. In this paper I will explore the ethical issues surrounding
parents acting as proxy consenters for their children in regard to the disclosure of incidental findings. I
will focus specifically on unique challenges which may arise from the fact that a parent has particular
obligations to her child which may be at odds with what the child would choose for herself were she
capable of informed consent. When it comes to incidental findings which will likely be significant to the
child only in adulthood, I propose a routinized opt-in system in which a child is informed upon reaching
the age of majority of her right to inquire about incidental findings. Under the system I propose, the
question of whether there are – for a given patient – any significant incidental findings is left open, and
the subject is able to make the decision of whether she wants to be privy to whatever information might
be available to her. If she opts in, then at that point she will go through the standard procedure for
informed consent before receiving any findings. If she simply does nothing, then she will not face the
prospect of being saddled with unwanted and potentially distressing information. In this way, the
subject’s “Right to Know” and her “Right to Not Know” are preserved.
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Can the Principle of Procreative Beneficence Justify the Non-Medical Use of
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis?
Biplab Halder
Faculty of Medicine, Memorial University of Newfoundland (Canada)
The Principle of Procreative Beneficence (PB) is a pronatal view in reproductive ethics which was
originally formulated by Julian Savulescu in his paper “Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should Select
the Best Children”. Further development of the principle was done in another paper titled “The Moral
Obligation to Create Children with the Best Chance of the Best Life” in collaboration with Guy Kahane.
The principle states that the parents have a moral obligation to select the best possible child, when
selection is possible, by means of the genetic screening of the embryos. Preimplantation Genetic
Diagnosis (PGD) is a reproductive technology that makes it possible to discover the medical and nonmedical genetic traits of embryos. PB justifies employing PGD not only for medical reasons, but also for
non-medical reasons. Moral controversy arises when PGD is employed in order to select the preferred
sex or certain genetic traits such as the intelligence of the child. The central inquiry of the paper is to
find out whether non-medical use of PGD can be justified by PB proposed by Julian Savulescu. To
explore this issue, I put forward the question: can PB make such a strong claim that the parents have a
moral obligation to select the best possible child by employing PGD? In other words, what are the
justifications of PB for claiming a moral obligation for the parents? I argue against the pro-selection view
of Julian Savulescu exploring the basic assumptions and moral justification of PB. PB presumes that the
non-medical and medical use of PGD are mutually inclusive in the question of a moral obligation for the
parents. However, I show that this is not the case if we consider the possible consequences of PGD in
the potential life of the child; the non-medical and medical use of PGD are mutually exclusive in terms of
their implication on the child. PB also presumes a degree of parental obligation in its concept of
‘significant moral reason’ in the case of employing PGD which is morally problematic. Finally, I argue that
the moral foundation of PB is based on the ‘common moral intuition’ which is not an authentic source of
a moral truth; hence, PB is not justified to claim a moral obligation for the prospective parents regarding
the non-medical use of PGD.

Public Health and Risk Prevention: The Case of Ebola
Melinda Hall
Department of Philosophy, Stetson University
I investigate reactions in the United States among the public and within public health
institutions to the 2014 Ebola Virus Disease (EVD, or Ebola) outbreak in West Africa. I approach these
issues within the context of analyzing risk, risk aversion, and risk analysis using the
theoretical frameworks of Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. I argue that popular and public health
responses to Ebola call us to construct ourselves as risk-averse subjects. In these various moments or
arenas of bioethics discourses, one is encouraged to conceive of exercising one’s autonomy as a way to
conquer chance, i.e., as a matter of risk prevention. In other words, in this setting, morally responsible
subjects are those that attempt to manage risk through prediction and elimination, thus substituting
choice for chance. Meanwhile, risk is conceived of as attached to particular individuals and ideas. In the
case of prenatal testing, for example, the fetus is constructed as a vector of risk, which potential parents
must manage. Disability, connected to the “impaired fetus,” becomes a floating signifier for risk. So, to
14

Abstracts are listed alphabetically by last name of first author or panelist
whom does the concept of risk attach in public health settings? How did the social reception and public
management of EVD in 2014 demonstrate that the desire to eliminate the risk of infection was also a
desire to protect oneself from chance and manage those populations believed to embody risk?
I contend that an unintended consequence of public health discourse surrounding risk
prevention in the case of EVD is the deepening construction of particular African bodies as inherently
risky or vulnerable. Meanwhile, those in the West conceive of themselves as risk managers of these
populations, rather than as vulnerable bodies themselves. Indeed, researchers found that stigma plays a
role in misunderstandings with regard to the transmission and prevention of EVD (Davtyan et al.
2014). Further, I found that in public discourse surrounding the question of Ebola, race acts as a
key floating signifier referring to risky persons, risky traits, and the idea of risk. For example, travel bans
applying to affected countries, including Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone, were widely called for by
public figures and in social media. These calls and related discourse were racially inflected. United States
President Barack Obama was accused of having special ties to West Africa which prevented him from
seeing the need for a travel ban (e.g. Media Matters 2014). Obama rejected outright travel bans, but did
set into place special screening procedures at airports for those traveling from affected countries into
the US. Some calls for travel bans and screening procedures may not be remarkable, given that viral
infection (unlike disability) is genuinely communicable. Yet, panic over the threat of Ebola (partially
expressed as panic over the presence, or potential presence, of West African persons and those
resembling West Africans) vastly outstripped its potential impacts, especially when compared to far
more widespread and also deadly viruses such as seasonal influenza. In other words, travel bans
were not necessary and were only called for as a result of race-related panic.

The (Un)Certainty of Care
Raymond Higbeaa
School of Public, Nonprofit and Health Administration
Alyssa Luboff, Department of Philosophy
Grand Valley State University
This paper examines two kinds of uncertainty in healthcare. One is a generic uncertainty
present in all human endeavors, constantly increasing with the pace and intensity of our society. The
second kind of uncertainty is one that is presently being built into our healthcare system as we
transition from “fee-for-service” payment models toward outcomes-based reimbursement. These new
models, linking payment directly to patient health and satisfaction, introduce a new layer of persistent
and incorrigible uncertainty into the healthcare system. No administrator or financial planner can
predict or control the feelings and well-being of patients with as much accuracy and reliability as
phenomena that yield “harder” data. We will argue, however, that this second form of uncertainty,
which seems to be more of a contingent than an inevitable feature of our healthcare system, stands not
only to improve its overall efficiency and function, but to restore the ideal of “care” in healthcare.
Current models of care delivery are structured around the certainty of payment for performing
physician-directed activities (fee-for-service). The new outcomes-based models, on the other hand,
emphasize the uncertainty of uncontrolled patient activities (value-based purchasing, negative and
positive risk sharing). The purpose of these new models is to incent improved patient outcome and
more efficient use of resources, based on greater coordination of care.
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To a certain extent, the uncertainty of the new models can be managed by implementing
control mechanisms. The drawback, however, of such controls is that they risk recreating the same
problems of bureaucratic excess and informational overload that they were meant to address. We
propose that what should be taken into account here is the greater shift reflected in the transition
between these two kinds of models. The old models define the healthcare system as composed of
separate, isolated pieces to manipulate and control. Its proper functioning, then, depends on the
application of the proper practice heuristics, regulations, and rules. This reflects greater certainty not
only at the financial level, but at the ethical level as well. Patient autonomy and respect of persons can
be “measured” by signatures on consent forms, plans of care, and discharge instructions. Justice can be
demonstrated by a count of how many disenfranchised, underrepresented, or minority individuals are
served. The new models have the potential to define the system more holistically, as composed of
intelligent, living pieces that work together. Such an interpretation of the healthcare system suggests
not only new financial and administrative measures, but an ethical shift as well, informed by the
feminist critique of an ethic of justice and concomitant call for the development of an ethic of care. This
involves the infusion of relational values, such as communication, compassion, interdependence,
attention, and context, into our current healthcare system. While these highly qualitative values
introduce the greater uncertainty of reduced administrative control, they stand to make the system
itself more intelligent and responsive. Relational values can increase the efficiency not only in the use of
resources, but in the functioning of the resources themselves, because each piece of the system
becomes empowered and intelligent in itself. In this way, a relational ethic can temper the bureaucratic
and informational excesses that remain a danger even for the new outcomes-based models. Of course,
adopting these new values demands a certain ethical and emotional maturity on the part of
administrators and other large power-holders in the current system. This process may be helped by
seeing that such values can restore to the healthcare system not only greater efficiency but care itself,
the well-being of patients and of all actors involved.

Trying and Dying: Are Some Wishes at the End of Life Better?
Oliver Kim
Independent Researcher
Independent In 2015, both chambers of the US Congress considered two legislative proposals
related to care at the end of life. One proposal passed the House of Representatives as part of a larger
package, and this proposal paralleled a “right to try” movement. The other proposal failed to be
amended into a larger package being debated by the Senate, and this proposal would have assisted in
advance care planning efforts with seniors.
While these two pieces of legislations are unrelated, it is striking how easily the “right to try”
passed as part of a larger bill while at the same time, a very modest proposal on the periphery of the
“right to die” debate did not. And in state legislatures across the nation, such efforts are even more
dramatic: “right to try” bills have passed in several states while “right to die” proposals have not seen
even a fraction of the same success.
This debate says a lot not only about our politics but also our policies around end-of-life
decision-making. While we want a society that values life, we also want a society that empowers
individuals to make their own decisions, particularly about their health and well-being.
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Examining the Psychosocial and Ethical Issues Arising from the Identification, Disclosure, and
Communication of Genomic Results to Patients and Clinicians
Lan Le, Natalie Bartnik, Michele C. Gornick and Nicole Exe
Center for Bioethics, Social Science and Medicine, University of Michigan
Chair: Raymond DeVries
Center for Bioethics, Social Science and Medicine, University of Michigan
Panel summary: Precision medicine relies on genomics to customize health data and provide
novel insights about disease mechanism, disease risks, potential responses to medication, and
alternative treatment options. For many patients with advanced or rare cancer, either the standard of
care is ineffective or no standard of care therapy exists. Genomic sequencing of tumors from such
patients could inform choices regarding clinical trials or targeted therapy based on the molecular
characteristics of the cancer. However, little is known about how patients and clinicians will respond to
the use of genomic sequencing in clinical oncology.
The proposed panel will include findings from part of the Michigan Oncology Sequencing Center
(MI-ONCOSEQ) research study at the University of Michigan examining the psychosocial and ethical
issues expected to arise from the implementation of genomic sequencing into clinical care. MIONCOSEQ uses integrative clinical sequencing to expansively profile genetic aberrations in both somatic
and germline DNA of patients with rare, advanced or refractory cancers.
Specifically, the panel will discuss patients’ understanding and expectations surrounding the use
of genomic sequencing information, oncologists’ use of genomic results in clinical management, the
delivery of genomic sequence results to oncologists, and the publics’ preferences for the return of
secondary genomic findings.

Quarantining an A-symptomatic Carrier: A Reasonableness Standard
Christopher Marker
Western Michigan University Cooley Law School
The focus of the paper is the due process implications (both procedural and substantive) of
quarantining an a-symptomatic carrier of an infectious disease. The paper discusses the rights of
individuals and the ability of the government to infringe upon these rights to protect the health of the
general public.
The paper begins with the story of Thomas Duncan, the individual who had the first confirmed
case of Ebola that came to the United States from Africa during the 2014 outbreak. The paper then goes
on to discuss the characteristics of Ebola and similar infectious diseases with a focus on diseases that
have the ability to be carried by individuals without showing signs of infection, making them asymptomatic carriers. This is followed by a discussion concerning the history of quarantine law in the
United States and a brief explanation of the evolution of constitutional due process. The procedural due
process portion focuses on the fact that individuals are entitled to a trial in most instances before their
freedom can be infringed upon. This is meant to show why it would be impractical to hold a full trial
prior to quarantining individuals because they could potentially spread a contagious disease to
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individuals attending the trial or other individuals in the local area. The question then becomes, How do
you determine whether individuals have an infectious disease if they are not currently presenting any
symptoms? The paper provides background information on substantive due process rights and how the
government can infringe upon them because all United States citizens have the substantive due process
right to bodily integrity (the right to determine what may enter their body and refuse medical
treatment).
Next, the paper analyzes the reasonableness procedural due process standard and how it could
be applied to the government’s ability to quarantine an a-symptomatic carrier. The paper analyzes the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) risk factors for each known infectious disease. The
paper then proposes that, with these risk factors as well as case precedent in other areas of law such as
criminal procedure (exceptions to the warrant requirement), it is reasonable to conclude that the
government has the ability to quarantine an individual based on a reasonableness standard.
The paper then analyzes the substantive due process right to bodily integrity and how it applies
to testing an a-symptomatic carrier for an infectious disease. There is case law to suggest that the
government has the ability to compel individuals to have diagnostic tests done if they are at high risk of
exposure to the disease based on the CDC’s risk factors. However, because this is a substantive due
process right, the government will have to pass the strict scrutiny standard in order to infringe upon it,
and this is very difficult.
The paper concludes that a case on point is necessary to decide whether subjecting an individual
to medical exams without his or her consent to determine if the individual is an a-symptomatic carrier
complies with substantive due process. However, quarantining a suspected a-symptomatic carrier of a
contagious disease, like Thomas Duncan, without a prior hearing would likely be reasonable and
therefore comply with procedural due process.

The Unintended Consequences of Neurotechnological Enhancement
Tabitha Moses
School of Health Sciences, Human Services and Nursing, Lehman College, City University of New York, Bronx
National Core for Neuroethics, Division of Neurology, Dept of Medicine, Univ of British Columbia (Canada)
Over the past decade the numbers of new and innovative neurotechnologies have increased
exponentially, and these advancements seem only to keep growing. Scientists and even DIY inventors
have succeeded in developing devices that could enable enhanced vision, hearing, and memory in
addition to creating a whole new range of senses. While many of these devices have been designed with
the intention of treating disabilities or diseases, they also have the potential to enable unparalleled
enhancement. While we have previously had access to a set of chemical enhancements, these new
technologies will open the doors to a tremendous growth of opportunity.
In spite of all the positive treatment outcomes associated with these technologies, and the possibilities
for positive neurotechnological enhancements, there may be a darker side to them. Currently, the
attitude of “bigger is better” is held by many who espouse the benefits of such enhancements, and
there are certainly aspects of this approach that are irrefutably positive. However, there exists a host of
unknown risks associated with the use of these new technologies for neuroenhancement; we are
entering previously uncharted territory. While we have seen significantly positive effects of these
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advances, these positives do not prevent the likelihood of future negative outcomes when we attempt
to use these advancements in technology for enhancement rather than treatment.
One major concern is whether our bodies and brains are able to cope with the additional inputs that
may be created through the use of neurotechnological enhancing devices. It is possible to examine real
life examples in which it appears that the individuals with a specific disorder have become overwhelmed
in some way due to a natural neuroenhancement or alteration. Further examination of these
pathologies (such as autism spectrum disorders, synesthesia, and hyperthymesia) will help reveal to
what extent we should be concerned about the potential for a type of cognitive overload due to the use
of neurotechnological enhancements. In the end, the concerns with these enhancements may not be
based on potential internal limitations, but instead stem from the world around us and the way it may
function to overwhelm a person should they become neuroenhanced. These technological advances
have significant potential both in treatment and enhancement; however, it is important to be fully
aware of the potential physiological and psychological risks of these devices.

Author Meets the Critics: Mark Navin’s Values and Vaccine Refusal
Mark Navin
Department of Philosophy, Oakland University
Mark Largent
James Madison College of Public Affairs, Michigan State University
Heidi Malm
Department of Philosophy, Loyola University Chicago
Jamie Lindemann Nelson
Department of Philosophy, Michigan State University
Panel summary: This panel focuses interdisciplinary critical attention on Mark Navin’s Values
and Vaccine Refusal (Routledge, 2016). In this first book-length philosophical treatment of vaccine
refusal, Navin argues that we can best understand current debates about vaccines by placing them in a
broader narrative about medical expertise and civic engagement. Values and Vaccine Refusal focuses on
the shifting epistemic and moral terrain surrounding an educated public’s relationship with health care
and society – a relationship characterized by wariness of experts and elites, withdrawal from
participation in public projects, and do-it-yourself models of reasoning and practice.
Navin argues that some parents have good reasons not to defer to the expertise of physicians,
and to rely instead on their own judgments about how to care for their children. Unfortunately,
epistemic self-reliance systematically distorts beliefs in areas of inquiry in which expertise is required
(like vaccine immunology). Navin also observes that vaccine refusers and mainstream medical
authorities are often committed to different values surrounding health and safety. For example, while
vaccine advocates stress that vaccines have low rates of serious complications, vaccine refusers often
resist vaccination because it is ‘unnatural’ and because they view vaccine-preventable diseases as a
‘natural’ part of childhood. Also, Navin argues that parents who refuse vaccines rightly resist the
utilitarian moral arguments – ‘for the greater good’ – that vaccine advocates sometimes make. But he
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concludes that vaccine refusers also sometimes embrace a pernicious hyper-individualism that sanctions
free-riding on herd immunity and cultivates indifference to the interpersonal and social harms
unvaccinated persons may cause.
The “critics” in this session have expertise in diverse areas that are relevant to the arguments
Navin makes.
Mark Largent is an historian of science, technology and medicine. His research and teaching
focus on the role of scientists and physicians in American public policy. He is the author of Vaccine: The
Debate in Modern America (Johns Hopkins, 2012). Heidi Malm is a philosopher who specializes in ethical
theory, bioethics and law. Her academic research focuses on ethical issues involving autonomy and the
prevention of harm, with a current focus on issues within the field of preventive medicine and law.
Jamie Lindemann Nelson is a philosopher who works primarily in bioethics. Much of her work brings to
bioethical questions resources from areas of philosophy that the current discussion tends to overlook.
She is particularly interested in philosophical issues that arise from thinking about intimate relationships
— including families and family-like contexts.

Re-thinking Mendelian Genetics:
What are the Ethical Implications for the Use of CRISPR Together with Gene Drive in Humans?
Michael W. Nestor, The Hussman Institute for Autism, Baltimore
Richard L. Wilson, Department of Philosophy, Loyola University, and Department of Engineering
Management, The University of Maryland, Baltimore County, Catonsville, MD
CRISPR genome editing has already reinvented the direction of genetic and stem cell research.
For more complex diseases it allows scientists to simultaneously create multiple genetic changes to a
single cell. Technologies for correcting multiple mutations in an in vivo system are already in
development. On the surface, the advent and use of gene editing technologies is a powerful tool to
reduce human suffering by eradicating complex disease that has a genetic etiology. In this paper, we
critically analyze this hypothesis from an ethical perspective by developing an anticipatory ethical
analysis of the implications for the use of CRISPR together with gene drive in humans.
Modern molecular biology techniques have allowed genetic engineering for many decades,
however this manipulation of the genome has been limited due to lack of specificity and off-target
effects. Recently, the advent of CRISPR gene editing techniques has been used to very precisely edit the
genes of cells and organisms in a highly efficient manner. CRISPR can be used to edit the germline of
embryos, implying that any corrected or introduced mutations can be subsequently passed to offspring.
However, the limitations of Mendelian genetics prevent rapid changes in the populations of some
CRISPR-edited organisms. By combining CRISPR with gene drive, edited genes can be spread throughout
an offspring population at rates significantly higher than Mendelian genetics would predict. In rapidly
reproducing populations like insects the combination of these systems has the potential to wholesale
change the genetic characteristics of entire populations rapidly. CRISPR and gene drive has been
proposed to be used to induce negative ecological impacts on invasive insects or organisms, and prevent
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the reproduction of malaria-containing mosquito populations. These uses imply that this technology can
be easily controlled and will benefit humans.
Although wholescale changes can occur in the population genetics of rapidly reproducing
species, changes in organisms with a long life-span would take decades or centuries using CRISPR and
gene drive. This, combined with the notion that over long periods of time natural selection may undo
the effects of CRISPR and gene drive and artificial mate control can limit their scope, has been used as
an argument against the effectiveness of these technologies in humans.
Using an anticipatory practical ethics based on Robert Audi’s moderate intuitionism, we explore
the implications of a CRISPR and gene drive system in humans and whether there are sufficient ethical
concerns based on this analysis.

Accepting Uncertainty: Applying Uncertainty as a Heuristic Tool to the Issue of
Medical Errors
Angelika Potempa
Department of Philosophy, University of Texas-Rio Grande Valley
This paper combines ideas from Ignorance Studies, nepistologies, and Object-Oriented Ontology
and applies them to the discourse on medical errors. Known knowns and unknown knowns concerning
certainties and uncertainties with regard to improving the quality of the health care system are
discussed. This approach allows for discussing uncertainty as epistemological and ethical as well as
socio-economic and political problems.

Ethical Issues in Genome Sequencing in Research and Clinical Settings
Michael Pritchard, Department of Philosophy, Western Michigan University
Elaine Englehardt, Department of Philosophy, Utah Valley University
A new generation of DNA sequencing tools has made it quite affordable to determine the
complete sequence of a human genome. Our presentation focuses on ethical issues regarding the use
of these tools both in research and in clinical settings. Some of the ethical concerns include: 1) the
treatment of incidental findings that result from genetic testing; 2) potential conflicts of interest of
physicians who use their patients as participants in research; and 3) communication challenges for
researchers and clinicians who have to determine whether and how to inform participants or patients of
findings, especially in light of difficulties researchers, clinicians, primary care physicians, participants,
and patients may have in knowing how best to interpret the practical significance of the results.
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In exploring these questions, we will reflect on our recent advisory role in a project proposed by
a University of Iowa team of medical researchers specializing in the area of severe visual impairment.2
They proposed to use exome findings from their patients in their research as well as well as to use their
findings in providing their patients with clinical advice. The use of the exome requires that a large
fraction of each patient’s genomic sequence be obtained and analyzed. However, in addition to
uncovering information relevant to what they are looking for regarding their patients’ visual disorders,
the researchers can expect to encounter many incidental findings—findings that are apparently
unrelated to those original questions. Such incidental findings will include variants of both known and
unknown significance, information about carrier status, and information about risk for late-onset
disorders. In the case of an incidental finding, there are numerous ethical considerations regarding
when (and how) a result should be presented to a research subject or a patient. A common view is that
individual sequence variation results should be provided to participants only in circumstances where this
can be expected to have actual utility for them. For example, the results may suggest a preventive or
therapeutic intervention, or the information could be used for reproductive decision-making or general
life planning. However, as further research is conducted, earlier research results may acquire practical
utility that was not originally evident. So, questions remain about the retention and possible future
communication of data to participants.
In light of uncertainties about how to proceed in such rapidly developing areas, the Presidential
Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues’ report, Anticipate and Communicate: Ethical
Management of Incidental and Secondary Finding in the Clinical, Research, and Direct-to-Consumer
Contexts (Dec. 2013) offers useful ethical guidelines regarding what types of information can, should, or
should not be offered to participants in research contexts and patients in clinical settings. In our
presentation we will give special attention to questions about how this information should be conveyed.
Additionally, we will discuss difficulties in discerning participants and patients’ wishes and expectations
regarding the return of results during the informed consent process. Finally, we will discuss problems
that genetic counselors and geneticists face in protecting participants and patients emotionally and
physically, as well as in ensuring their confidentiality and privacy.

2

“Exome Sequencing for Clinical Care of Vision Disorders,” proposed to NIH by Edwin M. Stone, M.D./PhD.; Val
Sheffield, M.D./PhD.
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Dharma Traditions and Medical Professionalism
Rajiv Rangrass
Department of Family and Community Medicine
Western Michigan University Homer Stryker M.D. School of Medicine
My talk is about the concept of Dharma as the foundation of ethical behavior. Dharma embodies
the ethical principles for descendants of the Indus valley civilization who are not brought up following
the Abrahamic tradition that is so common in Western society.
The Abrahamic tradition gives pre-eminence to the concept of one powerful God. We recognize
these associated faiths to be monotheistic. In contrast, within many arising traditions in the Indian
subcontinent, the concept of Dharma, described as ‘righteous action and righteous thought’, blends
with the idea of a personal God, or ‘Ishta-Deva’. This pluralism is often interpreted as polytheism by the
Western mind. As an example, in Buddhism, there is not even a concept of the entity we commonly call
God; Dharma forms the primary foundation of ethical behavior.
As a physician I am very much aware of the influence of the Greek philosophical thought
processes and their blending with the teachings from the Old and the New Testament in shaping ethical
behavior within the medical profession in the West.
While I am not a man of religion, I want to introduce the audience to the more ancient and
universal concept of Dharma. This concept often enables me as a physician to arrive at the same
conclusions from the standpoint of Ethics as the home grown Westerner. However, equally often it
allows me a fresh breath of air in the midst of an ethical dilemma where sometimes I might find my
colleagues stuck.
In this talk I share simple illustrations of these concepts and how they may be applied in daily
medical practice to enhance professionalism.

The Social and Ethical Aspects of Fertility Preservation
Robert Rebar
Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology
Western Michigan University, Homer Stryker M.D. School of Medicine
The first birth following in vitro fertilization (IVF) and embryo transfer was less than 40 years
ago. Yet since that time the potential uses for this technology have increased to the point that as many
as 4% of all births in developed countries occur as a result of IVF. We now have the ability to store
spermatozoa, oocytes, embryos, and even testicular and ovarian tissue in the frozen state for future use
as a part of IVF with varying degrees of success. Although these technologies were originally developed
for infertile couples, it quickly became apparent that such technologies could be marketed to single
individuals wishing to build families, to individuals with fertility ending diseases, and to young women
who might wish to “guarantee” their future fertility and who were not yet ready to begin a family. In
fact, companies such as Facebook and Apple have indicated that they will pay for younger women in
their employ to cryopreserve gametes so that they can delay childbearing.
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These capabilities, this marketing, and these offers raise a host of ethical issues that are stirring
debate both among the public and among professionals in the field. Despite the widespread publicity,
very few programs have the capability of providing fertility preservation services that have a reasonable
likelihood of ending in a pregnancy, a fact not widely appreciated by the public. Thus, we must consider
just who is ethically qualified to offer such services. Are programs with little or no experience deluding
themselves and their patients about their ability to provide reasonable services? Should there be
minimum standards and experience before services for fertility preservation can be offered? As a
corollary, should we arrange for patients who might benefit from fertility preservation to travel to the
best clinics and sites at which to undergo these procedures? If the programs with these capabilities are
limited, should we permit women who wish to preserve their gametes for “social” or age-related
reasons to do so at the risk of having insufficient resources for individuals with life-threatening illnesses
that need fertility preservation? Do we have an obligation to provide services for fertility preservation to
all individuals with diseases such as cancer who will need treatments with a reasonable likelihood of
diminishing future fertility? Or should such services be provided only to those who have the ability to
pay for such services by themselves, without benefit of insurance coverage? Just what does social justice
require? Given the limited numbers of births following fertility preservation worldwide, and the
relatively low chances of success at this time, are we providing unreasonably optimistic expectations for
patients?
If and when the technology improves and becomes more widely available, there still will be
other ethical issues to consider. How do we make decisions about fertility preservation for children with
serious but potentially treatable disorders (such as leukemias and lymphomas)? How should preserved
gametes and gonadal tissue be handled after the death of the individual from whom they originated?
How do we ensure that company-sponsored fertility preservation is not exploitive? Will the widespread
availability of fertility preservation services increase women’s reproductive autonomy or merely lead to
new and different pressures and ethical dilemmas?
These issues will be addressed, but certainly not definitively answered, in this presentation.
Fertility preservation heralds a “brave new world” that demands discussion and scrutiny.

Development of a Psychological Framework for Patients with Chronic Pain and Depression and Its
Impact on Ethically Appropriate Treatment
Michael Redinger
Department of Psychiatry, Program in Medical Ethics, Humanities, and Law
Western Michigan University, Homer Stryker M.D. School of Medicine
The psychological treatment of patients with chronic pain and depression has been under
examined, despite their frequent co-occurrence in primary care and psychiatric settings and multiple
challenges to the provision of quality care. It is common for physicians and other health care providers
to encounter patients who present with severe depression and/or suicidal ideation triggered by the
frustration, and, ultimately, the despair associated with severe, unrelenting, treatment-resistant chronic
pain. These patients often display challenging behaviors that can frustrate and even demoralize their
health care team and are often exacerbated by provider awareness that the common treatment
modalities have significantly contributed to an epidemic of iatrogenic opioid addiction. This
combination of factors frequently disrupts the ability to form and maintain a constructive physician-
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patient relationship, which is the foundation for ethical medical care and can, in turn, further exacerbate
the patient’s presenting complaints.
The ethical provision of quality care for patients with chronic pain and comorbid depression
would likely be benefitted by a psychological framework which acknowledges and explains the
challenging nature of working with these patients. This paper proposes such a construct utilizing the
work of bioethicist Carl Elliott, who argues that the secular perspective on medical care in the West
elevates the power of the medical sciences to deity-like status. Yet, when treatments are generally
lacking, as in the case of chronic pain, providers inevitably find themselves incapable of meeting the
expectations that patients’ desire. I argue that when this occurs, patients may undergo an existential
suffering analogous to a “crisis of faith” which can trigger the “difficult” behaviors that providers
struggle to manage. However, knowledge of this construct may help providers better understand the
psychological turmoil experienced by chronic pain patients and supply a robust platform upon which a
mental health provider could base psychotherapy. As a result, proper utilization would help decrease
the likelihood of rupture in the physician-patient relationship and result in higher quality and more
ethical care.

Sleepless Nights: The Consults that Continue to Haunt
Michael Redinger
Program in Medical Ethics, Humanities & Law
Western Michigan University Homer Stryker M.D. School of Medicine
Stephen Jefferson
General Pulmonary Medicine and Critical Care Medicine, Borgess Medical Center
Robert Beck
Pediatric Intensive Care, Bronson Methodist Hospital
Chair: Tyler Gibb
Program in Medical Ethics, Humanities & Law
Western Michigan University Homer Stryker M.D. School of Medicine
Panel summary: Over the course of their careers, Clinical Ethicists often see similar types of
cases, or cases with similar themes—identifying surrogate decision-makers, end-of-life decision-making,
navigating withholding/withdrawing inappropriate medical treatment, etc. These cases can become
somewhat routine and unmemorable. However, during a career, Ethicists generally experience a handful
of cases are different. The reasons why any particular case sticks in the mind may vary. Sometimes
appropriate, well-considered ethical recommendations are ignored. Sometimes the ethical analysis
required by a case is uniquely nuanced or novel. Sometimes the emotions of a patient, the family,
members of the healthcare team, or even the ethicist, are particularly poignant. These cases can cause
significant emotional anguish, disquiet, may prompt introspection, reflection, and, possibly, a change in
consultation practice, and, even years afterwards, these cases continue to haunt clinical ethicists.
This panel, comprised of individuals who collectively have been engaged in clinical ethics
consultations for many years, will each present one case that continues to haunt him or her. By
confronting, discussing, and analyzing these difficult cases, this panel will offer reflections on difficult
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cases and offer insights for the training of other healthcare professionals who have or will experience
their own particularly troubling cases. This panel will also allow for significant question/answer time for
audience discussion of additional cases.

The Ableist Conflation:
Empirical Folly, Inductive Risk, and Disability Bioethics
Joel Michael Reynolds
Department of Philosophy, Emory University
In a 2015 article in the Boston Globe, Stephen Pinker argues, “even a one-year delay in
implementing an effective treatment could spell death, suffering, or disability for millions of people.”
Despite the growing number of bioethicists that address or engage disability critiques of bioethical
positions, the ableist conflation of disability with pain, suffering, and death continues. In this paper, I
argue that this conflation commits four errors—empirical, epistemic, conceptual, and ontological in
nature—and I explain how these errors bear on applied debates ranging from selection criteria for IVF
PGD to death with dignity.
The first error is empirical: much social scientific literature attests to the flourishing of lives lived
with disability. Furthermore, longitudinal studies in psychology on psycho-social adjustment suggest that
attitudes of able-bodied people towards disability are misguided. Upon receiving a life-altering diagnosis
or suddenly becoming disabled, a combination of ableist expectations and catastrophizing leads subjects
to be depressed for the first six months and up to a year or two. After this time period, however, new
normals are created and people typically report that they are flourishing, even if in a very different way
from before.
The second error is epistemic: because the relation between a given form of embodiment and
the flourishing it will experience is largely unknowable, judgments over quality of life pose great
inductive risk, i.e., the epistemic and non-epistemic risks of being wrong. While selection for or against
race or gender are widely condemned, there is no widespread consensus that it is ethically wrong to
select against Down syndrome, e.g. This is despite no evidence to suggest that people with Down
syndrome necessarily live less flourishing lives, which renders judgments over it to have high inductive
risk. The third error is conceptual: disability studies scholars distinguish between impairment and
disability, healthy vs. unhealthy disability, and visible vs. invisible disability, among other designations.
Much of the disability stigma latent in bioethical discourse trades on this lack of knowledge about and
conceptual imprecision concerning various forms of disability.
The fourth error is ontological: if disability is understood as any state outside of the healthy
able-body, we all experience disability in infancy, via injury and illness, and, if we live long enough,
aging. On such a definition, disability is an ontological fact about the course of life of the human
organism. Yet, given the ADA, disability is also a legally protected minority in the United States of
America. Also, many of its forms are distinct cultures, as with Deaf culture or some who identify as
Neurodiverse. Conflating disability with pain, suffering, or death ignores the different meanings of
disability and the multiple ontological registers on which it operates. In doing so, the ableist conflation
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hinders bioethical debates by promoting empirical folly, indefensible inductive risk, conceptual
confusion, and ontological oversight. It perpetuates the historical denigration of disability and
exacerbates genuine issues of uncertainty with respect to disability and bioethical concerns.

PARADIGM SHIFT: How the Opioid Epidemic is Driving Change in Perception, Treatment & the Law
Lauren Rousseau
Western Michigan University Cooley Law School
In December 2015, the federal Center for Disease Control released new numbers concerning
drug poisoning fatalities in the United States. Drug overdose deaths have again surged, from 43,982 in
2013 to 47,055 last year, which means that every day, nearly 129 people die from drug overdose. Drug
overdose deaths have almost tripled since 1999, and more than half of the 2014 overdose fatalities were
due to opioid medications and heroin.
This presentation explores the reasons behind our nation’s current drug epidemic, as well as
how that epidemic is driving change in policy, addiction treatment, and the law. One driver of the
exponential increase in opioid and heroin use has been the systematic overprescribing of opioid
medications by physicians during the past decade. The Substance Abuse & Mental Health Services
Administration recently reported that four out of five heroin users begin with abuse of prescription
opioid medications.
Historically, our country has viewed addiction as a moral failing warranting criminal
sanctions, rather than as a health issue requiring treatment. This is true despite the fact that the
medical community has recognized addiction as a brain disease for decades. Until recently, our
approach to drug abuse and addiction has centered on criminalization and incarceration. Over 50% of
those incarcerated in our federal prisons are there due to drug-related offenses, yet for the most part,
our jails and prisons do not offer addiction treatment. Moreover, the criminal record a person carries
upon release from prison creates barriers to recovery from addiction.
The current drug epidemic is driving public policy and perception away from the “addiction as
moral failing” paradigm, and towards an “addiction as disease warranting treatment” paradigm. This
shift in thinking is demonstrated in many ways, including by the increased availability of health
insurance coverage for addiction treatment, increased access to medications that reverse drug overdose
and help stabilize recovery, and changes within the criminal justice system to direct persons struggling
with addictions to treatment rather than jail.
A number of ethical issues are raised by some of these changes. For example, to what extent
might the availability of medications that reverse drug overdose and changes in the criminal justice
system encourage continued drug use? To what extent might medication-assisted treatments actually
perpetuate addiction, rather than support recovery?
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In addition to the above issues, two controversial ideas that have been less widely embraced
deserve mention – needle exchanges and safe injection sites, both of which focus on harm reduction
rather than treatment. Lastly, Portugal’s approach to its own addiction crisis is instructive. In 2001,
Portugal decriminalized all drug use and possession, and focused its resources on addiction treatment,
with encouraging results.
Addiction has become a public health crisis in this country that can no longer be ignored.
Solving the problem requires a paradigm shift in perception, treatment, and the law, driven by
recognition that addiction is a disease, and not a crime.

This Medication May Kill You: Cognitive Overload and Mandated Informed Consent
Devin Schindler and Tracey Brame
Western Michigan University Cooley Law School
The Federal Government requires pharmaceutical manufacturers to provide prospective
customers with an extraordinary amount of information. Justified under the doctrine of informed
consent, the Food and Drug Administration has imposed comprehensive guidelines that regulate
virtually every aspect of how medications can be marketed. Similar obligations are imposed on
physicians involved in biomedical research.
Although informed consent is a cornerstone to the ethical practice of medicine, recent studies
employing fMRI technology suggest that mandated disclosure of “too much” information can result in
cognitive overload and irrational decision making. The paradoxical effect of the mandated disclosure
requirements is that they likely lead to patients choosing to not take beneficial medications. This
paradoxical effect arises from three well-studied psychological phenomena: (1) “Recency-Primacy, (2)
“Satisficing” and “Probability Neglect.” The combination of these three effects in patients who have
been inundated with excessive information results in decision making based on anecdote and emotion,
instead of logic. Studies also suggest that most people are extraordinarily bad in assessing risk,
particularly when an activity poses an infinitesimal but highly consequential risk. In plain language,
people overreact to miniscule risk. Hence, when the government requires pharmaceutical
manufacturers to disclose in advertisements such risks, the effect is for patients to err on the wrong
side; i.e. not taking medication that could provide great benefit.
Government-mandated messages also raise serious First Amendment concerns. Government
action that compels physicians and pharmaceutical companies to convey mandated messages sits at the
crossroads of two divergent legal doctrines. Compelled speech of “political” messages are strongly
disfavored under the First Amendment. Regulation of commercial speech, however, is generally subject
to a lower level of scrutiny. These two doctrines, one focused on laws compelling speech and the other
on laws which restrict speech, conflict in situations where the government imposes informed consent
requirements which are contrary to the speaker’s favored message.
This multidisciplinary study combines case law, the philosophical underpinnings of the First
Amendment, political theory, and emerging research into how the brain organizes and manages
information to come to the conclusion that many of the rules imposed by the government to insure
informed consent are counterproductive and likely unconstitutional.
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This presentation is adopted from an article previously published by the authors in the Whittier
Law Review entitled “This Medication may Kill You: Cognitive Overload and Forced Commercial
Speech,” 35 Whittier Law Review 1.

Anticipating Future Effects:
The Role of the Doctrine of Double Effect in Medical Care and Research
“The Doctrine of Double Effect in End-of-Life Decisions,”
Adam Shatsky
Department of Philosophy, Kent State University
“Research on Children, Placebos, and the Doctrine of Double Effect,”
Jeffrey Byrnes
Department of Philosophy, Grand Valley State University
Panel summary: When faced with an unknown future, physicians, researchers, and regulatory
bodies are often ethically compelled to reconcile their intentions with a variety of anticipated
consequences and numerous possibilities. This is familiar territory to the ethicist acquainted with the
Doctrine of Double Effect. Philippa Foot (1967) introduced what is typically regarded as the most
influential version of the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE). As she writes, “By DDE I mean the thesis that
it is sometimes permissible to bring about by oblique intentions what one may not directly intend.”
Foot’s intention was to bring to fore the moral distinctions between intended and unintended
consequences, and between positive and negative duties––that is, the duty to render aid weighed
against the duty not to inflict harm.
The implications of Foot’s work sparked a debate not only in moral psychology, but also in
applied philosophy, particularly in healthcare ethics. Those who invoke some variant of DDE (in the
medical field) raise interesting questions as to both the nature of physician-patient relationships and the
relation of researcher to subject. As we shall discuss, these questions seem to arise because who invoke
DDE often do so from a very specific picture of what those relationships should be. Our papers examine
the occurrence of DDE in clinical, specifically palliative, care and in medical research, offering a critique
to each. In so doing, we recognize the explanatory power of DDE, but are suspicious of its normative
value in matters of health care.
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The Google of Personalized Healthcare: 23andMe and Enabling the Privatization of Genetic Biobanking
Kayte Spector-Bagdady
Center for Bioethics and Social Sciences in Medicine, University of Michigan
23andMe is back on the market as the first direct-to-consumer genetic testing company that
“includes reports that meet [Food and Drug Administration] FDA standards for being clinically and
scientifically valid.” Its current product includes 36 health-related carrier-status reports and consumers’
raw genetic data (in addition to ancestry and other non-medical information). Forbes reports recent
investors estimate its value at $1.1 billion. But that valuation is not on the basis of 23andMe’s $200 test
kits. While its frontend product is selling individual genetic tests online, its back-end business model is
amassing one of the largest privately owned genetic databases in the world. 23andMe offers an
inexpensive product to consumers (personalized genetic analysis) to generate broader consumer data,
and then leverages that data to generate profit becoming—as board member Patrick Chung put it—“the
Google of personalized health care.” And it recently surpassed its goal of 1 million consumers. While the
focus of the debate surrounding direct-to-consumer genetic testing has been on whether FDA regulation
is necessary to protect consumers receiving potentially sensitive medical information without a
physician intermediary, the more important question moving forward will be how to regulate use of
consumer data.
Private control over genetic databanks has important implications for public health and genetic
epidemiology. While some argue that commercial interest and funding is critical to encourage
innovation of therapies, others point out that it is only through open access that researchers can work
with the breadth of data needed to make advancements in the field—as well as verify the results of
others’ research. Genetic epidemiology can contribute to preventative public health measures by, for
example, isolating environmental versus genetic risk factors. But access to a large dataset is required to
do this research, with some hypothesizing that a cohort would need at least 500,000 participants.
Research of isolated families at risk for genetic disease has met with less success than largescale
genome-wide association studies that require data across a large population. President Obama’s new
Precision Medicine Initiative biobank is founded on the concept of the centralization of already existing
research and data. While the goal of the Precision Medicine initiative is individualized clinical care, the
process requires public health research and analysis. But the privatization of a large cohort of genetic
data tied with epidemiological factors can stagnate the advancement of such research and possibly the
field of personalized medicine itself.
As HHS revises our decades-old human subjects research structure, it is necessary to consider a
cohesive approach to regulating private genetic databanks. This strategy should allow FDA and other
department agencies to play a role in expanding current regulatory coverage. Approaching data- and
bio-banks as assets that are as vulnerable and valuable as the individual datum that creates them will be
critical, as we increasingly rely on their use, to both ensuring that federal funding continues to be the
gold-standard research resource and that as much research is covered by federal protection as possible.
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Ethical Communication in Human-Subjects Research:
Creating an Informed Consent That Effectively Communicates Risk and Promotes Personal Autonomy
Chris Trudeau
Western Michigan University Cooley Law School
One of the main purposes of the Federal regulations regarding human-subjects research and the
recently released Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that seeks to update these Federal regulations
is to enhance the protection for those individuals who contribute their time and assume risk to advance
the research enterprise, which benefits society at large. As such, the primary goal of human-subjects
research is not to aid the specific person treated – it is to advance scientific research for society’s gain,
not the specific individual’s (as the NPRM, itself, suggests). Because individual participant interests
aren’t the primary focus of research trials, there are unique ethical implications that researchers and
their legal counsel must consider regarding the method and manner in which they communicate with
these participants. In fact, one of the goals of the NPRM is to “increase human subjects’ ability and
opportunity to make informed decisions . . . .”
This session will address two of the challenges of communicating the required disclosures under
the current and proposed federal regulations – the method and manner of presenting the 15-18
disclosures to research participants. Specifically, this paper will propose regulating the informed consent
process – rather than just the form – and it will discuss creating a functional risk hierarchy of the
mandated disclosures under Federal law. In the end, these two changes should dramatically improve
participant understanding of the risks and benefits of engaging in a research trial.

Ethical Omission and Aspect-Blindness
William Vaughan
Department of Philosophy, Ashland University
The theme of this conference is Bioethics: Preparing for the Unknown. Yet the title confronts us
with the age-old problem of how is it possible to prepare for something about which little is known. This
paper seeks to explore some of the deepest unknowns in medical ethics, the issues of ethical omission
and aspect blindness. The problem of ethical omission is in regard to how to classify the morality of nonactions, or the omission of acts. The problem of aspect-blindness is when people (in medical contexts)
seemingly lose, or have revealed to be totally lacking in, their most basic ethical concepts, such as in the
recognition of another human being in affliction. The paper tries to make sense of these circumstances.
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Minors and Health Care
Hollian Willekes
Western Michigan University Cooley Law School
This paper gives an overview of what minors’ rights are when it comes to their health care and
treatment. Additionally it details several unique ethical and legal situations that providers may face
when treating minors.
Michigan recognizes the common-law right to be free from non-consensual physical invasions
and the doctrine of informed consent and its corollary, the right not to consent. In the case of minors,
who are generally considered legally incompetent to consent to medical treatment, parents generally
have the right to consent to medical treatment or refuse medical treatment for their children. There are
situations, however, when parents might not have an absolute right to consent to care for their child,
and health care providers are confronted with the question of what to do. Sometimes what the parent
wants for their child is not in their child’s best interest. At other times the minor may be allowed to
consent to a specific treatment without parental consent, or even without parental knowledge of the
treatment. Adolescents in particular have several exceptions to the general law that parental consent is
necessary for medical treatment to minors. Providers routinely face legal and ethical issue which may
interfere with the provider’s ability to deliver care to a minor patient.
Sections of this paper include parental rights, non-parent decision makers, minor consent laws,
and access and disclosure of medical information and medical records. The importance of gaining
parental consent, while at the same time ensuring minors’ rights and wellbeing, is discussed in the
context of health care situations that providers often find themselves in.
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BCIs and Robotics: An Anticipatory Ethical Analysis
Richard Wilson
Department of Philosophy, Loyola University Maryland
Robotics research is merging with the latest medical technology to create a new generation of
prosthetic feet, legs, hands, and arms to give users a more natural feel and capability. Developments
began with comparatively simple microchip-controlled actions, then processors that translate muscle
movements into prosthetic responses and clinical trials on controlling prosthetic movements through
computer-interpreted brain waves. As these developments push the human-mechanical interface
further along, the ultimate result-one seen as achievable, at least in part, during this decade-is a form of
symbiosis. "In some discussions with the international standard-setting body for prosthetics, there is talk
of no longer speaking of prosthetic arms but of wearable robotic devices because today's prosthetics are
increasingly more robotic," says Dr. Robert Jaeger, director of deployment health research in the
Veterans Health Administration (VHA) Office of Research & Development. "The biggest breakthrough for
arms is the brain-computer interface. The dream of upper extremity prosthetic researchers is acquiring
signals directly from that part of the brain that controls the arm and processing those with a computer,
so the person using the arm doesn't have to do a lot of conscious movements. Instead, the prosthetic
reacts to them simply thinking about a movement. It's still a long way off, but there could be a
breakthrough at any time and certainly is an area the VA, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and
NIH are looking at for potential breakthroughs"
This analysis will focus on the current state of prosthetics, BCI’s (Brain Computer Interfaces) and
robotics for members of the military and members of society while performing an anticipatory ethical
analysis of expected developments in the same areas.
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